The Pentagon appointed the ex-Guantánamo Bay commander as its most senior officer in Pakistan: The lunatics truly are running the asylum
May 9th, 2008It would be quite funny if it wasn’t so very scary, and quite sad: to realise that obiviously no-one in the White House or the Pentagon really has a fucking clue:
WASHINGTON — When the Pentagon announced in March that Maj. Gen. Jay W. Hood would become the senior American officer based in Pakistan, it reflected the military’s aim to put a crisis-tested veteran in a critical job at a pivotal time in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan’s tribal areas. But nearly two months later, the military has quietly canceled the assignment of General Hood, a 33-year Army veteran who was excoriated in the Pakistani news media for one of his previous jobs: commander of the United States prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
It’s not nuclear science, people; we know the very recent history. The fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan ran into serious trouble because Bush decided not to pursue Bin Laden and the others but to invade Iraq instead. He did leave some of the army in Afghanistan and relied on the highly unreliable European NATO partners to take over some of the fighting, which most of these partners refused to do. That was a serious miscalculation on the part of the White House: to think that the countries who were lukewarm at the very best about the whole Iraq adventure would take over the fighting in Afghanistan was somewhat naive. Still, one might have expected these so-called partners to do a little bit more. As it is, they didn’t and still don’t but in terms of miscalculations this was a relatively mild one for the Bush administration.
There were two more, much bigger mistakes that the White House made though. The first of these was to rely on the Karzai government in Afghanistan to get at least some of his house in order. That was a seriously foolish expectation though, since Karzai had to rely on various warlords even to stay in office, let alone exercise any real power outside of the capitol - and none of these warlords had even the slightest interest in following the Bush agenda.
The second and even bigger mistake was what the Bush administration did in Pakistan. Having removed most of the US army, unable to rely on the NATO allies or Afghani forces, the White House made one last desperate gamble: to trust Pakistan’s army leader and dictator-in-chief Musharraf and to gamble that he a) would be able to stay in power and b) would be willing to actively pursue the Taliban and make sure that its forces couldn’t use Pakistan as a safe haven.
In doing so the White House chose to ignore the fact that the army had always condoned and even cooperated with Pakistan’s most hardline mullahs. Also, the army had long standing deals with Pakistan’s mountain tribes, who were the friends and allies of the Taliban. In order to stay in power Musharraf was happy enough to take the millions of dollars the US gave him - and he was also happy to parade in front of the cameras as the trustworthy and moderate ally of the USA. Musharraf was gambling that the support of the US would help him to stay in power, enabling him to do as he pleased with the opposition, with the tacit approval of the Americans. He was also hoping that if he did just the minimum that was required to keep the Americans happy, they would keep supporting him.
Musharraf’s gamble proved to be as foolhardy as any that the Bush government made. Even the token help he offered the Americans in the War against Terror proved too much for the various other power blocks in Pakistan. When he sent some of the Pakistani army into the mountains the local tribes saw this as an insult and they waged war on and humiliated these poorly equipped army troops. The mad mullahs and their Islamic schools were also deeply offended by anything that even resembled help to the infidel Bush and from silent partners of the military regime, they turned into Musharraf’s most dangerous enemies. So, in order to stay in power Musharraf became more and more dictatorial, alienating most of Pakistan’s society, from its reasonably moderate majority to its most rabidly violent minority. In the end, Musharraf lost his gamble, lost the presidency and even lost his army position.
The White House, of course, now was without any real ally in Pakistan. The fundamentalists hated the Bush administration more than ever, the moderates despised the White House for allowing Musharraf to oppress the moderate opposition and to fire most of the High Court judges. What’s worse, even during the years that Musharraf had been in power he had not done anything that was of any real help to the US in its fight against the Taliban. Supporting Musharraf had been another financial, political and military blunder. So, now the US no longer had any friends in Pakistan. Which was seriously bad news, for this meant the Taliban could now move with even greater ease between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Worse, in a way, was that all of this had left Pakistan seriously unstable and for a while it seemed that an Iran type Islamic revolution could be a possibility. Not a good scenario at all, especially since Pakistan had nuclear weapons.
In other words, the Bush administration needed to mend fences in a desperate hurry. The new Pakistan coalition government both either hated or deeply mistrusted the White House. It was willing to talk but not willing to do the Americans’ bidding. In other words, what the USA needed to do more than anything else was to tread very carefully, to be on its diplomatic best behaviour.
So, of course, what did the appalling White House & Pentagon idiots do? Yes, they gave the post of most senior officer in Pakistan to the guy who had been the boss of the Guantánamo Bay prison: one of the most hated symbols of all that is wrong with American foreign policy in the eyes of the whole of the Muslim world. Nice going! As I started saying, it would be very funny if it wasn’t so scary and sad - and no, they obviously don’t have a fucking clue, which does not bode well for any of the rest of the world.



















